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Abstract -,\;'.
Artifact categories prove to be an interesting challenge for researchers
interested in categorization as it may be impossible to list necessary and sufficient
features for them, contrary to defining features theories. On the other hand,
theories employing "fuzzy" concepts are thought to be too unconstrained to account
for categorization (Murphy & Medin, 1985). An alternative view detailed by Malt,
Sloman, Gennari, Shi, and Wang (1999) is presented. The Malt et al. view
suggests that there may be two processes which can be thought of as
categorization: naming and recognition. Recognition is driven mainly by
similarity, while the communication process which governs naming has its own
processes which may be separate from recognition. This research addresses a
fundamental question raised by the view. Specifically, what sorts of features
separate one category from another: functional, physical, or some combination of
multiple features? In my study I attempt to separate the names from the
recognition categories and begin to examine the extent to which similarity
accounts for naming. Core theories dictate that functional features will be the
only features important in categorizing artifacts. If function is indeed the core
then consideration of functional features will fully separate linguistic categories.
If, however multiple types of features are needed to account for linguistic
categorization, support will be lent to the Malt et al. view. This research
demonstrates that functional features are not the only features important in
categorization and sheds doubt on core theories.
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Artifact Categories: Evaluating Theories of Linguistic Categorization
Artifact categories have proved to be an interesting challenge for researchers
interested in categorization. This is due in part to the difficulty in listing necessary
and sufficient features for artifact categories. Whereas with natural kinds the
argument can be made that there may be some sort of defining feature that all
members share, for artifacts, this may nottbe the case. For instance, it might be said
that ostriches are members of their species by virtue of the fact that all ostriches
share a genetic code which is the necessary "feature" (Keil, 1989). Artifacts arguably
do not possess such hidden properties like genetic code that make them members of
a kind. There is no hidden property that all chairs share that makes them chairs.
Also, artifact categories are more variable within the category than members of
natural kind categories are (Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi, & Wang, 1999). For
instance, the category "robin" is a natural kind category; members of the category do
not show much variability. All robins have similar body structures, organs, and
genetic structures. The artifact category" cereal bowf', on the other hand, shows a
lot of variability in its members, and new shapes and styles of cereal bowls are
created regularly. Despite variability and the ever changing nature of artifact
categories, we are still able to distinguish objects called "bowl" from those called
"dish" and objects called "dish" from ones called "plate". Extant theories of
categorization are unable to account for how we do this. Below, I discuss major
theories of categorization and how they require revision to be able to account for
various data.
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Existing theories of categorization tend to cluster around two poles. On the
one side are theories postulating cores ofdefining features which uniquely determine
acategory, and on the other side are theories which postulate "fuzzy" concepts which
probabilistically specify a category. I will discuss how both types of theories relate
to artifacts, beginning with core theories.
Core Theories
Classical view
The classical view of categorization is a good example of a core theory
(Smith & Medin, 1981). The classical view postulates a set of features which
define a category and only that category. This set of features must be possessed
by each member, and not by members of other categories; that is, these features
are necessary and sufficient to determine category membership. Because each
member must possess the category's necessary and sufficient, or defining features,
every instance of the category should be an equally "good" instance. Pillow or
beanbag chairs should be no worse an example of a chair than a familiar dining
room chair. Thus, under this theory, there is no way to have an atypical member
of a category and still have the member belong to the category (Lakoff, 1987;
Murphy & Medin, 1985; Smith & Medin, 1981). One cannot say that the pillow
chair is a chair but not a typical one even though it intuitively makes sense that a
pillow chair is still a chair, but a rather atypical one.
The classical theory soon runs into additional problems when we consider
whether categories do have a set of invariant feat~res associated with them. Let's
return to the example of the category "chair"; a list of necessary and sufficient
3
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features for the category might include, for sitting on, has three or four legs, and
is made of some sort of hard material, like wood or metal. Thus, in order for
something to be called a chair, it must have all three of these characteristics, and
no other object may have them~ But pillow chairs are categorized as chairs and
they neither have three or four legs nor are they made of hard material.
Furthermore, what of a stool, which shares many properties of "chairness" (e.g. it
is for sitting on and is made of hard material), but is not explicitly called a chair?
As this example illustrates, it becomes exceedingly difficult to come up with a set
.of features which is true for all members of one category and that members of no
contrasting category share (Lakoff, 1987). In fact, despite many years of
searching, psychologists and philosophers have been unable to 90me up with any
necessary and sufficient features for categories (Murphy & Medin, 1985; Smith &
Medin, 1981). This, by itself, does not spell the end for the classical theory
because one could argue that the defining feature will be obscure or extremely
abstract and we simply have not discovered it. This is precisely the line of
reasoning the essentialist view takes. However, I will first discuss the research
against the classical view, then I will return to essentialist claims.
Empirical evidence against the classical view
There are several sets of empirical studies which do seem to suggest that
the classical theory is untenable as a theory of artifact categories; I will discuss
two of them. First, Rosch and Mervis (1975) demonstrated that variations in the
typicality of category members are correlated with variations in the distribution of
the features associated with categories. Specifically, items rated by participants
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as more typical also tended to have more features that were associated with the
category. Conversely, objects rated as less typical had fewer of the categories'
associated features. This is counter to the classical view because it logically
necessitates that all category members have the category's features, and it follows
that they should all then be equally typical. But the results also counter the
classical view on another front; namely, the correlation implies that there is
something important to categorization in those features associated with the
categor~with less than 100 percent probability. The second set of studies I
mentioned address this possibility more fully.
Hampton (1979, 1981) presents experimental findings suggesting that
people use what proponents of the classical view would call unnecessary features
in making category decisions. Hampton (1981) asked one group of participants to
list features of objects and rate the extent to which the feature was predictive of
category membership. Next, the list was used to predict categorization reaction
times for a second group of participants. Several critical results came from this
study. First, some of the features listed were non-defining features. Second,
these non-defining features were seen as important for categorization and were
correlated with the reaction times. Reaction times provide an index of
categorization performance. The presence of a common, yet non-defining feature
made categorization times quicker. For example, subjects might say that the fact
that a chair is made of wood is important for categorizing it as a chair, and
participants may be faster at making a category decision about a given chair that
is indeed made of wood based on the wood feature. But obviously, not all chairs
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are made of wood, hence wood is not a necessary feature of chairs. If the defining
features of ~he objects participants were asked t~ judge were really the only
important features for categorization, then thel?e features should have been the
only ones that facilitated the reaction times of the category decisions. In contrast,
. .
many non-defining features facilitatedreaction times in category decisions.
Clearly the classical view does not allow non-necessary features to be important in
making categorization decisions because it is precisely the necessary features and
only the necessary features which define the category.
As a corollary, the necessary and sufficient features assumption in the
classical theory implies that the boundaries between different categories will be
discrete. If all instanc~s of a category and no members of contrasting categories
. have these features, then the boundaries of the categories should be all or nothing.
Either a given object has the defining features and belongs to a given category or
it does not and belongs to another category. The research mentioned above by
Rosch and Mervis suggests that this prediction of the classical theory also does not
hold. Category boundaries appear to be fuzzy.
Essentialism
As mentioned previously, there is a second kind of core theory which
purports to solve some of the problems of the classical View. This view is called
psychological essentialism. Psychological essentialism claims that while it may
not be possible to come up with a set of features objects in a category share, one
may argue that objects within a category may share some hidden property that
makes them all members of a particular category. This hidden property could be a
6
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genetic structure or chemical composition, that is not obvious to the categorizer.
It is the non-obviousness of the essence which explains why-,people are not easily
~
able to point to a defining feature when asked to do so in categorization tasks
(Smith & Samuelson, 1998).
Essentialism is similar to the defining features view in that possession of
the "essence" determines category membership. However, it differs from classical
defining features views in that the feature that makes objects category members
is a hidden property and average people may know little or nothing about it. It
should be noted that most essentialist theories do not make the strong claim that
these essences reflect objective truths about the world, rather, it is enough that
people behave as though they believe that there are essences which
unambiguously define a category (Malt, 1994).
Indeed, for at least some natural kinds the essentialist argument may
account for how people categorize. Keil (1989) asked participants whether a
raccoon painted up to look exactly like a skunk was still a raccoon or had become,
instead, a skunk. The participants stated that the animal was still a raccoon even
though outwardly it was indistinguishable from skunks. Keil proposed that the
participants believed something inside the animal, like genes, made it a raccoon
despite changes in outward appearance.
Evidence against essentialism
The essentialist view may sound as though it is an improvement over the
classical view. Mter all, it does seem to provide a plausible explanation of why a
set of "obvious" necessary and sufficient features defining a single category was
7
never found. However, the essentialist view does not perform as well as a cogent
theory of artifact categories. Function is generally believed to be the essence of
artifact categories. Similarly, in recent years function has also been proposed as
the core property of artifacts for classical theories as well. Malt and Johnson
(1992) demonstrated that essentialism is not a valid theory for artifact categories.
The researchers performed a set of studies aimed at determining whether artifact
categories have cores. Specifically, they tested whether having the function
normally associated with an object is sufficient for determining category
I
membership. They also tested whether having a particular function is also
necessary for category membership.
With respect to the former, Malt and Johnson created a set of common
objects, some with their usual functions but with new physical features instead of
the physical features normally associated with the object and some objects with
their usual functions and usual physical features. If function were sufficient for
category membership, then the new physical features should have no effect on
participants' judgments of category membership. Put another way, consideration
of physical features would add nothing to category decisions; they should be
accounted for purely by determining the object's function. This was not the case.
The objects with the unusual physical features added had fewer participants place
them in their usual category than did the unaltered objects, demonstrating that
physical features did make a difference in category judgments and hence, function
was not sufficient for category membership.
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(To test whether possession of a particular function is necessary for category
membership, Malt and Johnson compiled a set of object descriptions where some
objects had normal physical descriptions paired with normal function, almost normal
or related function, or bizarre function. If having a particular function were
necessary for category membership, then objects with a related but different or
abnormal function should not be given the category label. Indeed those objects with
normal functions were almost unanimously stated to be members of the category.
However, more than half of the objects, both those with related functions and bizarre
functions, were also rated as members of the normal category. These results suggest
function in artifacts is also not necessary for determining category membership.
Fuzzy Concept Theories
Over time, evidence from studies such as the one mentioned above has
mounted which suggests that categories do not have a discrete all or none
structure as implied by defining features views, or unchangeable internal essences
that define categories. Rather, they have an analog or graded structure (Rosch &
Mervis, 1975). Put another way, there are no features or essences common to
every single category member, but there are features associated with the category
as a whole. Category members typically possess a subset of the associated
features. With some kinds of fuzzy concept theories, certain members of a given
category may possess many of the features associated with the category; these
members often become category prototypes.
These properties suggest that, at the other extreme, those theories
postulating fuzzy concepts may account for more of the categorization data. There
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are two main "fuzzy" concept theories, family resemblance theories (Rosch &
Mervis, 1975) and prototype theories (Reed, 1972). Both these theories maintain
that categories have structures of probabilistically associated features as
described above.
Family resemblance and prototype views
In a family resemblance structure, categories are viewed, not as discrete
bounded entities, but as networks of overlapping attributes. Objects will be
placed in a given category to the extent that they have features which overlap
with other members of that category. Most importantly, some objects within a
category may have many features in common with other members of the same
category, but because they possess some features not shared by many other
category members, they are removed to varying degrees from the objects at the
center of the category which do possess many of the category's associated features.
Going back to our "chair" example, pillow chairs are in the chair category even
though they share fewer of the features associated with chairs than a familiar
dining room chair does. By this example, we get the impression that perhaps
actual category boundaries are not as sharp as the classical or essentialist view
dictates.
The prototype theory is similar to the family resemblance theory except
that the prototype model has a central tendency which gets labeled as the category
prototype. This is a key difference. In both prototype and family resemblance
models there are multiple features shared by members of the category, and not
every instance will have every feature, but with the prototype model, people
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abstract a prototype from repeated exposure to individual exemplars. Prototypical
instances of a category will be precisely those members which have many features
in common with their own category and few features in common with other
categories (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Category membership is a function of the
overlap of a possible specific instance of the category with the prototype. Let's
take an example for clarification. Dining room chairs are highly typical chairs
because they have many features in common with the chair prototype and few
with other categories like "appliances" or "tools". Thus how likely a given object
is in the category would depend on the degree to which it overlaps with the
category prototype. The more features a given object has in common with the
category prototype, the more likely it is to be considered a member of that
category.
To sum up, in a family resemblance framework no abstraction process for
creating a prototype is postulated. Instead, there are multiple members with a
pool of shared features. Both prototype and family resemblance models predict
graded category membership.
Evidence against family resemblance and prototype views
Family resemblance arid prototype theories can account for graded category
boundaries; however, it has been argued that the family resemblance view is too
unconstrained to be a candidate for how humans categorize. This is because little
evidence exists to tell us what features are relevant to a category. Here the use of
the term unconstrained means that by themselves, family resemblance views do
not tell us which sets of features form possible categories and which form
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incoherent ones (Murphy & Medin, 1985). For instance, the formulation of the
family resemblance view cannot tell us whether one collection of features forms a
more coher~nt category than another. How are we to decide which collections of
features are the correct ones?
rhe family resemblance and prototype theories also fall prey to an
argument related to one of the arguments leveled against the core theories. With
core theories years of investigation yielded not a single unambiguous example of a
defining set of features. With prototype and family resemblance theories no one
has yet come up with a clear accounting of the internal structure of a single
category (Murphy & Medin, 1985; Smith & Samuelson, 1997).
Hybrid views
Both fuzzy concept theories and the core or essentialist theories can
account for some, but not all, of categorization, and both have serious flaws as
mentioned above. In an attempt to account for more aspects of categorization and
to overcome the flaws in each theory, researchers have created an amalgamation
of the two extremes which is often referred to as the hybrid view of categorization
(Medin & Wattenmaker, 1987; Keil, 1987). The hybrid theory was proposed to
overcome the difficulties with supposing that there must be a list of necessary and
sufficient features that every instance of a category possesses. The hybrid view
still maintains a core but that core is no longer an entire set of necessary and
sufficient features; it can be a single important trait, such as genetic codes in
natural kinds. This idea is similar to the essentialist view but the hybrid view
goes one step farther (Malt, 1990; Keil, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985).
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In addition to the core, there are also some features possessed by members
of the category which are probabilistically associated with the category and are
not present in every member. The key aspects of both classical or essentialist and
family resemblance models are preserved and combined. For example, under the
hybrid theory, the core of the concept "chair" could, in theory, consist of the notion
"for sitting on", whereas features like "has four legs" and "has a back" apply to
most chairs but not all and aid in the categorization of potential chairs. As
another example, take counter chairs at a diner which sometimes have but a
single "leg", or beanbag chairs which have no legs or back. These "chairs" do not
appear to share many properties in common with the majority of chairs, but they
still have the core function of being "for sitting on" and we would still be able to
identify an object as a chair.
On the surface it sounds as though the core feature and associated
probabilistic features proposed by the hybrid theory addressed many of the
problems 'associated with previous theories. However, the hybrid theory soon
encounters the same difficulty other core theories have. For the hybrid theory as
well, pointing out what the core feature is for any concept proves to be extremely
difficult in practice. Therefore, the hybrid theory, with its core feature
assumption, also falls prey to the same arguments leveled against the classical
theory, namely how to determine which features define the category (Lakoff,
1987),
. The hybrid theory also falls prey to the same criticisms of family
resemblance and prototype views. As with these theories, there is no principled
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way to determine what counts as one of the probabilistically associated features of
a hybrid category (Smith & Samuelson, 1997).
A New Framework
Naming versus recognition view
Research in categorization over the past years has swung back and forth
between the poles of fuzzy concepts and core theories, and no major progress had
been made (Malt & Johnson, 1992). Malt et al. (1999) have presented a theory of
categorization which is an alternative to both defining features and fuzzy concept
theories. Malt et al. maintain that "categorization" may really consist of two
separate processes: recognition and naming.
Treating these two processes as identical may have lead to the apparently
contradictory views categorization research has taken. When we begin to treat
the processes as separate we may be able to resolve the cycling and tension
between core and probabilistic theories.
Most importantly, the theory makes explicit the assumption that what has
been called "categorization" is really two different processes at work on a single
representation. The first of these is that people recognize objects as members of a
kind; recognition is based on similarity and consists of encoding into a
representational system. The model assumes that objects can be represented as
points in a multi-dimensional feature space. The clusters objects form in the
feature space correspond to the recognition categories. These clusters of objects
have no fixed or discrete boundaries, and the objects form these clusters on the
basis of similarity. Similarity can come from a number of sources: physical
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similarity, functional similarity, or overall similarity to name a few important
ones. According to Malt et al., different laboratory tasks draw attention to
different kind~ of features and thereby appear to produce contradictory results. In
other words, the dimensions influencing a category decision may be differentially
weighted depending on the task and characteristics of the category.
The second process that can be thought of as "categorization" is naming.
People attach names to objects when they discuss them. Names in the model are
associated with objects with varying degrees of strength. Name activation is
generally determined by an object's similarity to category exemplars. Hence there
is an explicit exemplar assumption in the model in line with work by Nosofsky
(1992, 1984) and Medin and Schaffer (1978). Exemplar views are a relatively
recent way to look at categories. More specifically, they share with prototype
views (as well as most others) the idea that categorization involves judgments of
similarity to stored representations. However, instead of comparing a novel object
to a single prototype, it is compared to specific previously encountered instances of
the category. These "instances" are the category exemplars. Furthermore, the
specification of a category is implicitly defined by its instances (Medin & Schaffer,
1978). Thus, with the exemplar assumption coupled with the assumption that
different processes affect naming and recognition, the model predicts that
similarity should account for names given to objects most of the time.
However, the framework leaves open the possibility that factors other than
similarity may enter into naming. Because communication has its own demands,
there are complexities that enter into the process of naming that do not affect
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recognition. One of these factors is the novel names manufacturers give to slight
variations on familiar items. For example, Maltet al. (1999) discuss a small
object with a flip up straw that, except for the small size, closely resembles other
plastic objects with flip up straws that are usually labeled "sports bottles".
However, this smaller object is called a "juice box" by the manufacturer because it
has a functional relationship to the cardboard juice boxes widely available to go
into children's lunch boxes. So the object would be closer in similarity space to
other types of plastic squeeze bottles, but is instead called a "box" on its package
label. This sort of process is known as historical chaining (Lakoff, 1987).
Convention is also a possible source of complexity in naming (Malt et al.,
1999). Ifpeople grow up hearing a given object called by a certain name, that
name will have a strong association with the object independent of the object's
similarity relations with other objects. Thus, in Malt et al.'s theory, naming is
strongly affected by processes such as chaining and historical convention. These
processes are separate from recognition processes.
Current Study
The present study aims to examine how the Malt et al. theory may prove to
be a viable alternative to both core and fuzzy concept views of categorization. In
this study I attempt to separate consideration of the similarity driven recognition
categories from the linguistic categories used to communicate about objects. I can
then examine some of the issues which follow from the naming versus recognition
VIew.
16
A subset of participants in the experiments that follow were asked to rate
pairs of stimulus objects on the basis of various types of similarity: physical
similarity, functional similarity, and overall similarity. The objects participants
were asked to rate were all objects used in the preparation and serving of food.
These data were used to generate a similarity space. This space corresponds to
the recognition categories discussed in Malt et al. (1999). In my analysis, rather
than generating multi-dimensional feature space, I used additive tree analysis to
generate the graphic depiction of the similarity relations between the· objects.
The rest of the participants were asked to provide names for the objects.
This is my measure of linguistic category membership. With both recognition and
linguistic data collected I can examine issues of the dimensions which best
separate the linguistic categories, and then to begin to identify objects where
similarity does not predict the name given to the object and offer some possible
reasons why this may be so.
The theory outlined above and the studies described lead to a set of
questions about features and category boundaries. What kinds of features
separate linguistic category boundaries where the linguistic categories are
determined by the names given to objects? We will look at three possibilities.
First, does an object's function determine its category membership? Under core
theories, an object's function is the best candidate for a core (Keil, 1989). If
function is truly the defining feature for artifact categories, one would expect that
function would delineate the boundaries between linguistic categories the best. If
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function does not do a good job at separating categories, further doubt will be cast
on core views.
Second, do physical features determine linguistic category membership?
Physical features include an object's shape, size, color, etc. If physical features
separate categories best, this outcome would be contrary to core theories but in
line with prototype views (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Most prototype theories take
physical features as the central features for category decisions, a point reflected in
much of the literature on prototype views. However, with respect to the physical
properties of artifacts, physical properties which define artifact categories have
not been discovered (Rosch & Mervis, 1975).
Finally, does overall similarity account for linguistic category membership?
The term overall similarity refers to some combination of features including but
not exclusively, functional and physical features. This is more consistent with the
Malt et al. view which assumes multiple dimensions underlying categorization,
but it is also in line with some other exemplar theories (e.g. Nosofsky, 1992; Estes,
1986).
I predict that overall similarity will do the best at delineating linguistic
category boundaries because, under the Malt et al. framework, no single
dimension or combination of physical or functional feature types is expected to
separate the linguistic categories fully. And by fully I mean with absolute
completeness, where all and only objects called "bowl" would be confined clearly to
a cluster, and so on. More features and kinds of information than is present even
in overall similarity will be required for any accuracy approaching this level. This
18
is suggested by the fact that no single feature type or combination of feature types
have been discovered that does clearly delineate boundaries for any given
category. Aside from these considerations, if we hold to the idea that a single
. . (.
feature will separate categories fully we are coming dangerously clc>se to endorsing
the classical theory again with its single or very small sets of defining features.
Also, I believe overall similarity will best separate category boundaries
because, in addition to functional features I believe that physical features are also
important to category decisions because many features we attend to in identifying
and classifying objects are the perceptually based ones like shape or material of
construction. Shape, for instance, may determine the difference between a bowl
and a plate. And past research by Malt and Johnson (1992) that was discussed
earlier, suggested that physical features were attended to and used by
participants making category judgments.
Some criticisms of the use of overall similarity must be discussed, namely
one could argue that overall similarity should separate categories the best, not
because Malt et al.'s assumptions are correct, but simply because with the
consideration of both physical and functional features more information is going
into the category judgment. Therefore, because overall similarity entails more
information we would expect better separation of categories regardless of the
underlying theory. This is not necessarily the case, however. When I ask
participants to make function and physical similarity judgments I do not stipulate
how many functional or physical features the participant should attend to. I
simply specify the type of features he or she should look at. The same argument
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holds for the overall similarity judgment. A participant could attend to the same
number of functional features as he or she could overall features. Even if there
are more bits of information going into the overall judgment, the function as core
theory maintains that physical information should not add anything to the power
of function to separate the categories. This is because the function as core theory
states that function is the sole determinant of category membership. Therefore,
overall should not, under core theory, be expected to do better than function.
A final issue regarding similarity types must be addressed. It could be
argued that differences in shape may be a byproduct of an object's function, and,
therefore, even if physical features are superficially important, function really is
the primary consideration in categorizing artifacts. Differences in shape do seem
to have consequences for how the object is used. Experience tells us it would be
difficult at best to serve soup on a plate. Notice, however, that functional and
physical features are dependent on each other in this case, but, at the same time,
they are not always the same thing. In many instances physical features will be
diagnostic of functional features, but, in many other cases those physical features
will not be diagnostic, yet will still be important for categorization. This point was
demonstrated in the Malt and Johnson (1992) research discussed earlier. In any
event, this issue rather than supporting function-as-core views, illustrates the
need for multiple types of similarity in categorization, which goes directly against
core theories.
The analyses I use on the data will focus mainly on determining which
similarity type is best at separating linguistic categories. I will also give a
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qualitative account of what kinds of specific features participants focused on
within each type of similarity. It is hoped that this will provide a closer look at
the recognition and linguistic categories by allowing some of the specific features
which were important for each type of similarity to be examined. Should many
different types of features be found in overall similarity, more support will be
given to the Malt et al.'s contention that multiple dimensions, or in this case,
types of features will be needed to account for naming.
Study 1: Naming
Naming data were collected from a group of participants. The names
. participants gave were used to determine the linguistic category membership ofeach
object in the stimulus set.
Method
Stimuli. The stimuli consisted of60 color photographs ofvarious bowls, dishes,
and plates. I chose those categories because they were closely related to each other
in that they are all used in the preparation and serving of food, yet they are not the
same. I attempted, with the stimulus set, to include as much variability in size,
shape, material, etc. as possible for these categories. Variability was emphasized to
reveal the boundaries of the categories. With many examples ofclosely related items
and items which run the gamut of exemplars, I can get a clearer look at where the
category boundaries lie. The objects used in the experiments were found in the
homes of members of the Psychology Department, the homes of friends of the
researcher, and in thrift stores.
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The initial set of 79 stimulus objects was pilot tested by having 10 Lehigh
University undergraduates provide names for all stimulus items considered. Those
objects which received the labels "bowl", "dish", or "plate" more frequently than any
other label were retained for the final stimulus set of 60 objects.
The stimulus set compiled after the pilot test included items such as large
divided plates, small decorative bowls, crystal candy dishes, and so on. All final
stimulus pictures were taken by the researcher against a grey drop cloth. The
distance from the camera to the object was also kept constant to preserve size
information. The same 15 inch wooden ruler appeared in each picture to maintain
scale. Some of the pictures used are shown in Figures 1-3.
Participants. Twenty-four Lehigh University undergraduates enrolled in
Introductory Psychology and Introductory Sociology provided names for the
stimulus pictures. Students received course credit for their participation.
Procedure
An initial set of 79 objects, which were mentioned above, was presented to
10 Lehigh University undergraduates, who received course credit for their
participation. The participants were asked to provide names for the 79 objects.
Those objects which were labeled a most frequent name other than "bowl", "dish",
or "plate" were not retained for the first stimulus set. So objects which received
names like "ashtray" more frequently than the labels "bowl", "dish", or "plate"
were rejected. There were 60 objects in this set.
A first naming study was performed on this set of 60 objects. Eighteen
Lehigh University undergraduates provided names for these objects for course
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credit. Eight of these objects were labeled with dominant names other than bowl,
dish, or plate and were removed from this stimulus set, leaving 52 objects.
Twenty-three new objects were added to the 52 remaining objects from the
above stimulus set for a total of 75 objects. For all of these objects naming and
typicality data were collected. Sixty of these objects which were called bowl, dish,
or plate more frequently than any other label were kept for all analyses discussed
in this paper.
Mter the participants entered the testing room, they were asked to glance
through the stimulus set to familiarize themselves with the objects contained in
the set. Each participant was then asked to provide a name for each object (a
complete set of instructions is included in Appendix A). They were told that they
were to provide the name for the object that they would use in ordinary
conversation. The instructions stipulated that the names could be one word or
more than one word, and that, though some of the objects may be difficult to"",
name, they should try to provide a name for each one. Mter the participant was
familiar with the naming instructions, the experimenter presented the stimulus
pictures to the participant one at a time.
Results
To determine the preferred name, all the names given by the participants
were tabulated along with the frequency of their occurrence. For each stimulus
object, the most frequently given name is the linguistic category membership
assumed for the remaining analyses. The names and their frequencies are
presented iIi Table 1.
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There were instances where there were two names with equal frequencies
for a few objects. I define an object with more than one dominant name as an
object with two names that were given with identical frequency or two names no
more than two apart in frequency. The most frequent name given to the object is
marked with a star in Table 1. For objects with two dominant names the name
most frequently given is marked with a star and the second dominant name is
marked with a karat. All objects received dominant names of either "bowl",
"dish", or "plate".
Study 2: Similarity
Similarity data were collected for use in additive tree analysis.
Method
Stimuli. The stimuli for this study were the same final set of 60 items used
in Study 1 except that the pictures were scanned into a computer file and were
presented to the subjects on a computer screen. The ruler was cropped out of the
photos for presentation to the subjects because of restrictions in the file size of the
photos that could be presented with the program we used for stimulus presentation.
The program used for stimulus presentation is called RSVP, version 3.0. The
pictures of the stimulus objects were still in color for the computer presentation.
Participants. Participants were 42 Lehigh University undergraduates
enrolled in introductory psychology or sociology who did not take part in Study 1, and
15 students at Brown University who had also not given any naming and typicality
judgments. The Brown students volunteered to participate for pay. Each Lehigh
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Frequency of label
No. Bowl Dish Plate Holder Container Saucer Coaster Tpprwre Platter Tray Cup .
1 22* 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 10* 7 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 3 2 18* 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 14* 7 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
5 17* 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 16* 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 20* 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 3 12* 5 7 2 0 0 0 0 4 0
9 14* 0 0 0 6 0 0 4 0 0 0
10 14* 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 2 10* 9A 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 12* 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0
13 17* 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 20* 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
15 23* 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
16 9A 11* 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
17 23* 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note. A "*,, indicates the most frequent name, while a "A" indicates a competing name.
Table 1
Frequency of names given by participants for Study 1.
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Frequency of label
No. Bowl Dish Plate Holder Container Saucer Coaster Tpprwre Platter Tray Cup
18 22* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
19 0 9* 4 1 0 2 1 0 1 2 0
20 11* 10" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 20* 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 14* 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
23 11* 5 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 11* 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 19* 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
26 3 6 9* 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0
27 0 1 22* 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
28 0 15* 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
29 0 14* 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0
30 10* 3 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 2
31 8" 10* 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0
32 8" 10* 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
33 12* 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
34 14* 1 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Table 1 continued
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Frequency of label
c
No. Bowl Dish Plate Holder Container Saucer Coaster Tpprwre Platter Tray Cup
35 0 15* 0 3 2 0 0 1 0 3 0
36 1 18* 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
37 1 16* 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 1 15* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
39 4 9* 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 0
40 1 15* 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
41 3 12* 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
42 20* 2 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0
43 9 3 12* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
44 5 8* 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2
45 0 12* 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0
46 0 8* 5 0 0 1 0 0 4 5 0
47 1 9* 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0
48 0 1 15* 0 0 7 1 0 0 0 0
49 0 6 16* 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
50 0 16* 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 0
Table 1 continued
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Frequency of label
No. Bowl Dish Plate Holder Container Saucer Coaster Tpprwre Platter Tray Cup
51 0 2 21* 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
52 9 1 13* 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
53 2 5 14* 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
54 0 1 22* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
55 0 2 22* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
56 0 11* 3 4 0 0 0 0 1 2 0
57 0 7 11* 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 0
58 0 0 24* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
59 0 9* 9* 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0
60 0 6 15* 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Table 1 continued
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student received course credit for participation.
Procedure
Participants were asked to rate the similarity of each object in the stimulus
set to every other object in the stimulus set. The pairs to be rated were presented on
a computer screen and the participant responded via the keyboard.
First, the participants were asked to perform a set of practice trials. They
were instructed that two pictures would appear on the screen following a brief
exposure to a cross in the center of the screen. Participants were asked to judge how
similar the objects presented were to one another. The scale for the judgments
ranged from one to eight. One was for very dissimilar objects and eight was for
highly similar objects. Participants were to respond on the keyboard, an eight point
numeric scale was clearly imposed over the middle row of the keyboard. The "a" key
was designated "1", and the ";" key was designated "8". The numeric scale was
clearly imposed over the keys. At this point the participants were given no specific
directions on how to judge the objects' similarity but they were informed that more
specific directions would be given to them later. The pictures for the practice set
were not any of the pictures used in the actual experimental trials.
Following the practice trials came a brief familiarization phase.
Familiarization trials were important because we wanted the participants to be
familiar with the range and variability of the objects they were rating. This way they
were less likely to judge one pair ofobjects as highly similar only to find that another
object was even more similar to one of the objects in the pairing than the one in the
original pairing was. For this part of the experiment, participants were asked to
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simply look at the set of 60 pictures to see what the stimulus set looked like. Again,
the presentation was on the computer. Each time the participant pressed the space
bar, six of the pictures were presented on the screen. Participants could look at the
six items as long as they wanted before pressing the space bar again to see the next
six objects. The items were grouped in numerical order so the first screen contained
objects one through six, the second items seven through 12, and so on.
Once the participant completed the familiarization phase, the experimental
trials began. For the experimental trials, participants were informed that they would
be indicating their judgments with the eight response keys just like they did in the
practice trials, except that for these trials they would be asked to judge the similarity
of the objects in a specific way. They were also told that these trials would progress
. in the same manner as the practice trials.
The specific manner in which they were to make their judgments was based
on a particular instruction given to them by the experimenter. There were three
different versions of rating the similarity of the objects: physical, functional, and
overall similarity. Each participant did only one type of rating due to the length of
the experiment.
For the physical instruction, 19 participants were asked to focus on the
physical properties of each object, such as what it looked like, what it was made of,
etc. They were told to rate objects which were very similar to each other in their
physical appearance (e.g., size, shape, and color) as highly similar and those which
differ in their physical appearance as less similar (for complete instructions see
Appendix B). For the Function instruction, a different 19 participants were asked to
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rate as highly similar those objects which were used in a similar way to prepare,
serve, or hold food and other items and to judge as less similar those objects which
were used in dissimilar ways (for complete instructions see Appendix B). Finally,
another 19 participants rated the objects on Overall similarity. These particip~nts
were asked to rate as highly similar those objects which were similar overall, that is
similar on features such as what the objects looked like, how they are used, or any
other aspects of the objects that seemed important or natural to the participant (for
complete instructions see Appendix C). The experimenter stressed to the participant
that they were to rate objects as similar only if they felt they were similar in the
relevant way, not because the objects were used together. For example, participants
were informed that I did not want them to rate a salad plate and a bowl for preparing
salad as similar because the objects were both used for salad and the objects,
themselves, would not necessarily be similar in function, physical, or overall features.
Each of the possible 1 770 pairwise comparisons of the 60 stimuli were
presented to the participants. Due to the amount of time it takes to make such a
large number ofcomparisons, the experiment was done in three separate sessions for
each participant. Each session lasted approximately one hour. The only difference
between the first session and the second and third was that for the latter two there
were no practice trials or familiarization phase. The pairs presented in each session
were randomly selected by the computer program used to control presentation. At
the beginning of each of the last two sessions, participants were asked to read the
instructions once more to refresh their memories.
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Results and discussion. Malt et al. (1999) used multi-dimensional scaling
solutions to generate the similarity space. I would have liked to have used the
same analyses because it would make the results comparable to the results Malt
et al. generated; however, similarity space as was created by multi-dimensional
scaling (MDS) solution for the present data set proved to be too complicated to
interpret. Instead, additive similarity trees were used to analyze the data; one
tree was generated for each type of similarity. The same similarity 'data used in
MDS procedures can be used in and represented as an additive tree (Sattath &
Tversky, 1977). MDS is a spatial model where each object is represented as a
point in coordinate space. Additive trees, in contrast, are network models where
each object is represented as a node in a connected graph (Sattath & Tversky,
1977). The relations of objects in the graph reflect their distance from each other.
Dissimilarity in additive trees is represented by the horizontal length of the path
joining the nodes. Often, with trees the stress of the fit is lower than with MDS
(Sattath & Tversky, 1977). This property is highly desirable because stress is a
measure of goodness of fit. Therefore, in many cases trees fit the data better than
MDS. Trees are also easier to interpret than MDS when the scaling solution does
not present a one or two dimensional solution.
Additive similarity trees can be used to determine if the particular kinds of
similarity separate category boundaries or group like named objects together. If a .
given similarity type is good at delineating linguistic category boundaries then
those objects will be closer together in the tree. In similarity trees similarity is
measured by looking at the path connecting a pair of objects. As one traces the
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path through the graph, the distance traveied horizontally is measured, vertical
moves are not counted in the distance. These horizontal portions of the path
connecting the objects will be shorter if objects are similar and longer if they are
less similar. Items at the top of the tree are most dissimilar from items at the
bottom of the tree. Therefore, if a particular similarity type is good at delineating
category boundaries, we could expect to see something like a stratification, with
one category more or less confined to the first part of the tree, a second below that,
and so on. Those horizontal portions of the arcs can also be considered a measure
of what features the objects connected by the path have in common (Sattath &
Tversky, 1977).
An additive tree analysis was run for each type of similarity. The results of
these analyses are presented in Figures 5, 6, and 7. The names listed at the
terminal nodes of the tree are the names of each object as determined in the
naming study. The stress value for a given tree should be below 0.1 in order to
say a good fit was achieved. The stress for functional, physical, and overall
similarity trees was 0.09, 0.07, and 0.08, respectively, indicating a good fit.
The question to be considered when looking at the trees is which type of
similarity forms the most homogeneous clusters; that is, which similarity type
places objects with the same labels closest together. It is also important to bear in
mind that since the tree analysis represents the similarity relations between
objects, this corresponds to the recognition component of the naming versus
recogn~tionmodel. Once again, the names which appear on the trees were
generated by the naming study. I begin my analysis of the trees with a more
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explicitly descriptive account of the placement of the objects for each type of
similarity. I will then move on to provide a statistically descriptive account of the
differences between the function, physical, and overall trees. Finally, for each
similarity type, I look at the clusters formed in the trees and give a qualitative
account of what sorts of features they share.
Looking at the trees, one can see that overall similarity appears the best
at separating the linguistic categories. Here the bowls are more or less clustered
together at the top of the tree, followed by plates then dishes. There are only a
few instances of plates being more similar (or placed within the bowls "section") to
bowls than to other plates, and so on. In contrast, with the physical and
functional similarities there were more heterogeneous groupings. For example, at
the top of both the function and physical trees many bowls cluster together, but
for both kinds of similarity there were many instances where there were plates or
dishes interspersed within the bowls. This means that these plates and dishes
were seen as sharing more features with bowls than with other plates or dishes
for the particular similarity type in question. As with bowls, plates and dishes are
also clustered best by overall similarity.
Visual inspection of the trees suggests that overall similarity judgments
provide the best accounting for names as evidenced by the superior clustering in
the overall similarity tree. However, a statistical test was devised to present a
more rigorous analysis of the trees. Looking back at the trees in figures 5, 6, and
7 one can examine the apparent clusters of bowls, for example, and see that, at the
top portion of the tree there are mostly bowls. Not every single object in the "bowl
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cluster" is a bowl, however. There are some dishes and some plates which appear
within this larger cluster. This suggests. that the homogeneity of labels within a
cluster can be used as a measure of clustering.
To get a numeric·description of the clustering of the various types of
similarity for statistical analysis, I defined a bounded cluster of, bowls, for
instance, and counted the number of intrusions by objects which were not called
"bowl" into that cluster. I compared this to the total number of objects in the
stimulus set not called "bowl". For reasons of clarity those objects which had two
dominant names, like the "dishlbowls" in the trees were excluded from the
analysis. This is because it is not clear what their category truly is. This left me
with 54 objects to use in the analysis.
The next question is how to determine what a cluster of objects should be.
One way to proceed would seem to be to find the first instance of bowl and count
down through the tree until some specified number of bowls is included, then to
count the number of intrusions of non-bowls in the cluster that method formed.
This simple algorithm is problematic because often the first instance of a category
occurred as an outlier very early in the tree. An alternative algorithm used which
solved the problem was to find the median bowl of the total number of bowls in the
tree and count symmetrically outward from the median until a specified
percentage of bowls were included in the cluster.
I have mentioned that I counted for the analysis a specified number of
bowls. There were several different numbers of objects considered. This is
because the number of included objects i~ asking the question of how perfect or
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inclusive do I expect the clusters to be. Do I expect 100% ofthe objects to be
clustered with few or no intrusions? This, in light of Malt et al.'s (1999) work
suggesting names will never be perfectly specified by similarity, does not seem
reasonable.· Figures like 50% seem too low to make sense. Three percentages
corresponding to three levels of inclusiveness were selected. I present analyses for
75%,80%, and 90% inclusiveness, though I focus mainly on the 75% measure as it
seems to me to be the best balance between inclusiveness and allowing for those
instances where similarity does not fully predict the name given to the object.
I will be using Chi-square analyses to explore the data. I employed the
Chi-square to compare the homogeneity of the clusters across the three similarity
types at each of the three levels of inclusiveness already discussed. Specifically, if
a type of similarity were good at clustering together like-named objects, then we
should find few intrusions of objects with different names within the cluster. In
contrast, if agiven similarity type does not cluster objects well, we would expect
many intrusions. The Chi-square test will reveal if the types differ from each
other in the degree of clustering, So, for each level of inclusiveness I counted the
number of intrusions of objects without the target label as the measure employed
in the Chi-square. The expected values for the Chi-square are generated from the
table of actual values and the number of possible intrusions (the number of objects
without the category label in question). Specifically, the expected values are
generated by multiplying the total number of intrusions found for all three
similarity types divided by the total of the row total (the grand total), and the
number of possible intrusions also divided by the grand total, and multiplying this
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number by the grand total. Chi-squares are done separately for each category,
"bowl", "dish", and "plate" since the categories themselves are non"independent.
Non-independence is a violation of the assumptions behind the Chi-square
analysis if we were to compare the categories directly. Since it is the case that the
categories, themselves, are non-independent the analyses are done for
completeness, but treated separately.
Bowl. I discuss the largest category in the study, "bowl" first. Table 2 gives
the number of intrusions in the bowl cluster and the number of non-bowls outside
the bowl cluster for each type of similarity at the 90% inclusiveness level, Table 3
is for 80% inclusiveness, and Table 4 is for 75% inclusiveness. The clusters were
obtained by counting symmetrically out from the median bowl. The values in
parentheses are the expected values from the Chi-square analysis.
The chi-square for bowls was not significant for the 90% inclusiveness
level, X2(2) =4.36, p > 0.05, indicating no difference in how well the three
similarity types clustered the objects. At the 90% inclusiveness level the test was
requiring that 20 out of the 22 bowls in the set be included in a cluster for
maximum possible clustering. As one can see in Table 2 there were a large
number of intrusions into the bowl cluster across types of similarity. At an
inclusiveness level of 80%, the chi-square is also not significant, X2(2) =4.3, p >
0.05. Eighteen out of 22 bowls must be included at this level. Looking back at the
trees, these levels of inclusiveness do not seem to reflect what to the eye seems
obvious, that overall similarity definitely performs better than the other two
types.
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Type of Similarity
Intrusions
intrusions in cluster
non-bowl outside
Total
Overall
16 (20.32)
16 (11.68)
32
Function
17 (20.32)
15 (11.68)
32
Physical
28 (20.32)
4 (11.68)
32
Total
61
35
96
Note. The number of intrusions of non-bowls in the tree analysis clusters and the number
of non-bowls outside the cluster are listed for each type of similarity.
Table 2
Chi-square table for bowls for 90% inclusiveness.
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Type of Similarity
Intrusions
intrusions in c1uster
non-bowl outside
Total
Overall
16 (17.34)
16 (14.66)
32
Function
12 (17.34)
20 (14.66)
32
Physical
24 (17.34)
8 (17.34)
32
Total
52
44
96
Note. The number of intrusions of non-bowls in the tree analysis clusters and the number
of non-bowIs outside the cluster are listed for each type of similarity.
Table 3
Chi-square table for bowls for 80% inclusiveness.
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Type of Similarity
Intrusions
intrusions in cluster
non-bowl outside
Total
Overall
1 (12.33)
31 (19.67)
32
Function
12 (12.33)
20 (19.67)
32
Physical
24 (12.33)
8 (19.67)
32
Total
37
59
96
Note. The number of intrusions of non-bowls in the tree analysis clusters and the number
of non-bowls outside the cluster are listed for each type of similarity.
Table 4
Chi-square table for bowls for 75% inclusiveness.
49
Despite the apparent lack of difference in clustering by the three similarity
types at the 90% and 80% inclusiveness, at 75% inclusiveness, there is a dramatic
difference. This is because the other two levels were always including an outlier
which pushed the number of intrusions higher. For instance, with bowl cluster at
the 80% inclusiveness level,. 17 out of the 18 bowls I was attempting to include in
a cluster were clustered fairly well for overall similarity. However, to capture the
final bowl an large number of additional nodes had to be included. At 75%
inclusiveness, there is but a single intrusion in the cluster of 17 bowls for overall,
12 intrusions for function, and 24 for physical. The chi-square on these
differences is significant, X2(2) = 21.47, p < 0.001. Looking at Table 2 it appears
that overall similarity is indeed the one with the best clustering power. However,
contrary to prediction function does not fare the worst in its ability to separate
categories. The greatest number of intrusions occurs in physical similarity.' I
compared physical and functional similarity for bowls in another chi-square to see
if this difference is significant, and it was, X2(1) =11.06, p<O.OO1. Thus, function
truly does outperform physical similarity at category separation, at least for
bowls.
Though the superior performance of functional similarity over physical
similarity is contrary to prediction, it still does not salvage the function as core
position. The function-as-core position dictates that physical features can play no
role in categorization. This position is untenable given that overall similarity
outperformed functional as well as physical similarity, and we have already noted,
some purely physical features were present in the overall similarity tree. Thus
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physical features do indeed playa role in category decisions. These data suggest
that multiple dimensions underlie categorization, which is consistent with Malt et
al.'s (1999) general view.
Plates. Chi-square tests were also performed on the plates. The number of
intrusions for plates at 90% inclusiveness is listed in Table 5, Table 6 is for 80%
inclusiveness, and Table 7 is for 75%inclusiveness. There was near perfect
clustering of plates for overall similarity (perfect for 90% and below). Looking at
the table it is obvious that neither function or physical similarity do nearly as
well. The chi-square for plates at the 90% inclusiveness level was significant,
X2(2) =31.6, p < 0.001. Again, I ran a chi-square on physical and functional
similarity alone. This chi-square, too, was significant, X2(1) =11.6, p < 0.05. And
again, function does outperform physical for the plates, this holds true as well for
80% and 75% inclusiveness levels.
The 80% and 75% inclusiveness levels for plates are identical and so are
reported as one. The chi-square is significant X2(2) = 40.37, p < 0.001. The chi-
square between physical and function was also significant X2(1) = 24.. 7, p < 0.001.
Dishes. Finally, the same analyses were run on the dishes category. The
intrusion data for dishes at 90% inclusiveness are presented in Table 8, Table 9 is
for 80% inclusiveness, and Table 10 is for 75%. At 90% inclusiveness, the chi-
square is significant, X2(2) =7.7, p < 0.05. A glance at Table 4 will reveal
superiority for overall and near identical performance for physical and functional.
The tables and data for 80% and 75% inclusiveness are also the same. The chi-
square is significant, X2(2) =9.47, p <0.01. Here it seems that physical might
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Type of Similarity
Intrusions
intrusions in cluster
non-plates outside
Total
Overall
0(20)
40 (20)
40
Function
26 (20)
14 (20)
40
Physical
34 (20)
6 (20)
40
Total
60
60
120
Note.~umber of intrusions of non-plates in the tree analysis clusters and the number of
non-plates outside the plate cluster for each type of similarity. The expected values are in
parentheses.
Table 5
Chi-square table for plates for 90% inclusiveness.
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Type of Similarity
Intrusions
intrusions in cluster
non-plates outside
Total
Overall
0(15.67)
40 (24.33)
40
Function
12 (15.67)
28 (24.33)
40
Physical
35 (15.67)
5 (24.33)
40
Total
47
73
120
Note.~umber ofintrusions of non-plates in the tree analysis clusters and the number of
non-plates outside the plate cluster for each type of similarity. The expected values are in
parentheses.
Table 6
Chi-square table for plates for 80% inclusiveness.
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Type of Similarity
Intrusions
intrusions in cluster
non-plates outside
Total
Overall
0(15.67)
40 (24.33)
40
Function
12 (15.67)
28 (24.33)
40
Physical
35 (15.67)
5 (24.33)
40
Total
47
73
120
Note.~umber of intrusions of non-plates in the tree analysis clusters and the number of
non-plates outside the plate cluster for each type of similarity. The expected values are in
parentheses.
Table 7
Chi-square table for plates for 75% inclusiveness.
54
Type of Similarity
Intrusions
intrusions in cluster
non-dishes outside
Total
Overall
4 (11.52)
32 (24.48)
36
Function
15 (11.52)
21 (24.48)
36
Physical
16 (11.52)
20 (24.48)
36
Total
35
73
108
Note...Bumber of intrusions of non-dishes in the tree analysis clusters and the number of
non-dishes outside the dish cluster for each type of similarity. The expected values are in
parentheses.
Table 8
Chi-square table for dishes for 90% inclusiveness.
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Intrusions
intrusions in cluster
non-dishes outside
Total
Overall
7 (7.67)
29 (28.33)
36
Function
14 (7.67)
22 (28.33)
36
Type of Similarity.
Physical
2 (7.67)
34 (28.33)
36
Total
23
85
108
Note.~umber of intrusions of non-dishes in the tree analysis clusters and the number of
non-dishes outside the dish cluster for each type of similarity. The expected values are in
parentheses.
Table 9
Chi-square table for dishes for 80% inclusiveness.
56
\
J
Type of Similarity
Intrusions
intrusions in cluster
non-dishes outside
Total
Overall
7 (7.67)
29 (28.33)
36
Function
14 (7.67)
22 (28.33)
36
Physical
2 (7.67)
34 (28.33)
36
Total
23
85
108
Note.~umber of intrusions of non-dishes in the tree analysis clusters and the number of
non-dishes outside the dish cluster for each type of similarity. The expected values are in
parentheses.
Table 10
Chi-square table for dishes for 75% inclusiveness.
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actually come close to performing as well as overall, the chi-square however, was
significant, X2(1) = 4.25, p < 0.05. Therefore, for dishes as well, overall does the
best. However, with dishes physical actually outperforms functional, X2(1) =9.41,
p < 0.01. Some potential reasons for this reversal will be presented in the general
discussion.
In summary, the chi-square tests, for each category, support the hypothesis
that overall similarity will perform best. The hypothesis that physical similarity
will outperform functional similarity was not supported for bowls and plates but
was for dishes. In any event, the fact that overall similarity did perform best
sheds further doubt on core theories.
It would be instructive to see what sorts of features objects closer to each
other in the tree analysis share. This is done for several reasons. First, it can act
as a sort of check on my similarity type manipulation. If, upon examination, the
tree for physical similarity for instance, contained many functional features, I
would have reason to suspect my participants were either not following directions
or that physical features simply are not important for categorization. Also,
especially with overall similarity, it is important to see if participants were indeed
considering combinations of features and not just focusing on a single type of
feature. Second, since a major part of this research is to examine the contention
that functional features form a core for artifact concepts, I need to look at the
features in overall similarity. If they turn out to be entirely or mostly functional
ones, my hypotheses about core theories will be demonstrated inadequate.
Finally, as was discussed in the introduction, there may be a relationship between
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shape and function. Examining shape information in the function similarity tree
may help to elucidate the nature of that relationship.
While a lengthy, technical analysis and treatment of the features issue
within the trees is not the focus of this research it is possible to obtain a
qualitative account of the features shared by clusters of objects in order to answer
the first question posed above. To achieve this, I looked more closely at what
objects fell into the clusters used in the Chi-square analysis, and searched for
features common to these clusters. I used the clusters which contained the central
75% of the objects of a given linguistic category.
For functional similarity, the features which appeared to be pivotal were
size, or diameter and the presence of dividers or lids. Objects with lids or dividers
tended to cluster together irrespective of size even though in most cases objects
tended to cluster on the basis of size. So, for example, the covered plate in Figure
7 was nearest to a small plastic soap box and a large covered bowl. These objects
were not placed near each other for any of the other types of similarity. These
features seem at first glance to be purely physical ones; however, I argue that this
is an example of a case of some physical features, like size, being important
indicators of function. This can easily be demonstrated. For example, the size of a
"plate" indicates whether it can be used to serve food to a large group of people or
used to serve a single person a small dessert. Other physical features, like color
and translucence, are not necessarily indicators of function, or how the object is
used. The other features mentioned as important for separating the categories in
the tree analysis for function were lids and dividers, which I argue are more
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certainly functional features. This is because lids and dividers, unlike color or
material, have important consequences for how an object is used. For instance,
the presence of a lid indicates the potential for food storage. In contrast, color or
material have little or no effect on whether or not one can use a given object to
store food.
Within the tree for physical similarity the objects tended to cluster on the
basis of size, color, and, opacity. Size, as I argued above, could be looked at as a
physical feature that is an indicator of function, although participants were told to
focus on physical similarity and to disregard function. Given that size could have
functional significance, it is worth stressing that size was not the primary feature
shared by clusters of objects for physical similarity. Color, in particular, had a
strong effect on the clustering, and color is clearly a non-functional feature.
Objects mostly clustered on the basis of size within larger clusters of color. For
example, Figure 8 shows a typical small cluster of objects from the tree analysis
for physical similarity. The objects depicted were all blue and were ordered
within that cluster of blue objects by size.
Finally, in the overall sort, objects clustered mainly by size and also by
depth of the vessel, with the physical material of construction also being
important. Arguably depth of the vessel is a functional feature, but size I have
argued is more difficult. It could be either a purely physical feature or a physical
indicator of functional attributes of the object. The importance of the depth of the
vessel feature could explain why the bowls were more clearly bounded to the
upper part of the analysis, as depth played a less significant role in the other
61
62
w
0:::
::J
tn
o
0-
X
W
o
z
o()
W
tn
...J
«
z
o
i=
z
W
I-
Z
62
types of similarity. Indeed, few bowls are included outside that cluster of bowls at
the beginning. There are, however a couple. Figure 9 is an illustration of one
such example. While the bowl is made of glass, it is noticeably deeper than the
objects around it. This distinction between clear glass objects and more opaque
objects was also an important feature for overall similarity. Note that
translucence is a purely physical feature. Again, this supports the contention that
physical features are important in making category decisions, and goes against
core theories.
Hence overall similarity does appear to be tapping into a set of features,
both physical and functional, which is superior to physical or functional similarity
alone at separating category boundaries. This is as predicted and lends support to
the Malt et al. framework.
Importantly, while overall similarity produced clearly the best clustering,
it was by no means perfect. For instance, interspersed within the cluster of bowls
is a dish and another object labeled both a dish and a plate. Likewise, there are a
few bowls within the main cluster of dishes. This too was predicted, because I
maintain that no single similarity type or combination of similarity types will be
sufficient for full category separation.
It does appear, from this qualitative analysis, that the manipulation of
different similarity types was successful, as well as instructive. Participants did
indeed focus on different features as instructed. Finally, these different features
led to a differential ability to separate the categories, with overall similarity
performing the best. Glancing back at the discussion for overall similarity
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suggests it is not the case that all or most of the features considered by'
participants were functional ones. Therefore, my hypothesis that core theories are
incorrect is not weakened by the types of features which seems important overall
similarity judgments.
As to whether shape could be determined by function or vice versa, these
results provided no clear-cut answer. In some cases, it appeared as if shape was
'~
being determined by function, but in other cases that relationship did not hold.
Further research is needed to settle this issue, as there are many subtleties to be
teased apart.
As another convergent test of what kinds of information were being utilized
in the overall similarity condition, each individual similarity matrix was
correlated with each other similarity matrix. If more functional features than
physical were going into the overall similarity judgment, then a higher correlation
between the functional and overall matrices than between the physical and overall
matrices would be expected. In contrast, if there are more physical than
functional features going into the overall similarity judgment the opposite pattern
of results would be expected.
Table 5 gives the results of this correlation. The correlation between
physical and overall similarity was the highest (r= 0.87). The correlation between
functional and overall similarity was lower (r = 0.78). This suggests that more
physical than functional features were going into the overall similarity judgment.
This is consistent with the hypothesis, that physical features are important for
categorization.
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It is of interest that the correlation between physical and functional
similarity, while lower than the other two correlations, was actually quite high (r
= 0.68). This could be taken as more indirect evidence that some, but not all,
physical features indicate, or diagnose, functional features or vice versa.
As a final point of discussion, the naming versus recognition view
maintains that most, but importantly not all, of naming will be accounted for by
similarity. The trees in my analysis also support this claim, because, especially
with overall similarity, there are a minority of objects that appear far outside
their cluster. These are the objects where similarity does not fully account for
nammg.
So far I have discussed the features that objects in the same cluster share,
but I now wish to look at those objects which ended up outside of their linguistic
category in the tree analysis. What, for instance, made a lone bowl appear in the
midst of a cluster of dishes? In examining those instances I find that there is
generally a feature of the object which is highly obvious and is shared mainly by
objects outside of that particular objects' linguistic category. The salience of the
feature is strong enough so that it is displaced to object clusters dissimilar to it in
most other respects. Figure 10 illustrates one such example. The three objects
depicted are adjacent in the tree analysis and occur within a cluster of 'dishes'
The object at the top left and the one at the bottom are labeled 'dish' and
dish/plate' respectively, while the one at the top right is called 'bowl' by the
majority of participants. In most respects the bowl is different from the other two
objects, but because it is cut or molded clear glass, it is placed with other cut or
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Type of Similarity
Similarity Type
Functional
Physical
Overall
Table 11
Functional Physical
0.68
Overall
0.78
0.87
Correlations between the three types of similarity matrices.
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molded clear glass objects which are not deep and also not labeled 'bowl'. Some
possible explanations of the processeswhich affect these objects is offered in the
general discussion.
General Discussion
This study set out to examine a set of questions about what sorts of features
separate linguistic categories. Core theories predict that function should be the core
feature or set offeatures for artifact categories, and as such would delineate category
boundaries best.
I had hypothesized that overall similarity would separate categories better
than functional or physical features. I also expected that no single type of similarity
would ever completely separate linguistic categories. This was indeed the case.
Looking again at the performance of overall similarity, we see a combination of
features, depth, size, and material, which does a good job ofseparating the categories.
Notice that these features include physical ones.
Thus I can conclude that multiple features, including physical features, will
likely be necessary to separate linguistic categories. This is contrary to core theories
that argue that a single feature, in this case function, will separate categories.
One of the central tenets of the naming versus recognition view is that
processes which affect recognition categories may be different than processes that
affect naming. Two of these processes were convention and chaining.' We see in the
tree analysis several instances of objects appearing outside their clusters. So a bowl
whose nearest neighbor is a dish warrants further examination. While the present
pair of studies is not sufficient for determining why a given object appears within a
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cluster that does not share its linguistic category, I propose that some ofthese objects
are there because of the two processes mentioned above. These are objects where
similarity is not predicting their names. With objects like these we can begin to
examine those processes which operate on naming alone. Now that this study has
identified several objects whose linguistic categorization may have been influenced
by these processes, later studies can be aimed at elucidating more clearly how these
processes create linguistic categories which are not perfect reflections of the
similarity relations between the categories.
A final point warrants discussion, in the Chi-square, for bowls and plates the
pattern of results was similar; overall similarity performed best at separating the
categories, while function was second best and physical was the worst at separating
the categories. For dishes the pattern was somewhat different. Overall similarity
was still the best at separating the dishes, but here physical actually was second best
while function came in last. Why there was this reversal is not obvious, but some
examination of the categories reveals a possible answer.
First, looking back at the three trees, notice that the dish category is generally
the most spread out. There are numerous dishes spread throughout the trees. Even
in the overall similarity tree the dish category shows the least coherent clustering.
I believe the reason for this is that there are two different senses of dish. Therefore
the name "dish" can apply to objects in two different ways; as a label for specific
objects such as a "casserole dish" and for the superordinate category of the objects in
the stimulus set. When we ask someone to "put the dishes on the table" we are
referring to objects called "bowl", "plflte", and probably some only called "dish".
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I argue that this property could account for the pattern observed in the trees
for the dish category. In the naming study, when participants were faced with
problematic items such as an object which looked like a plate but seemed too big to
receive the plate label, they reverted to labeling them with the superordinate "dish".
Clearing this duality up would require attempting to separate objects called dish in
the superordinate sense from the other objects called-dish, perhaps asking
participants some questions about their labeling strategies would more stringently
identify these two sets. Then we could look back at the trees and see if there was
actually sub-clusters of dishes for the two senses of dish.
Conclusion. In conclusion, I have demonstrated that function is not the only
feature used to make category decisions. In fact, functional features were not even
necessarily the primary features used in making category decisions. Core theories
maintain that function will be the core for artifact categories, hence my results
suggest that core theories are likely untenable as theories of artifact concepts.
Instead, it appears as though the naming versus recognition view may better account
for how people categorize, this theory predicted that multiple features or dimensions
will be necessary to better separate the categories because naming is a process with
added complexity. This process will be influenced by many factors, not just similarity
along a single dimension. Overall similarity with its multiple features and
dimensions was clearly the best at separating the categories, suggesting that the
naming versus recognition view has merit. To the extent that physical features are
the focus of prototype theories, my results weaken prototype theories as physical
features were generally poorest at separating the categories.
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Appendix A: Nam:ing Instructions
Naming Instructions.
We will go through the pile of pictures, and I would like you to tell me, for
each object, what you think you would call that object; just whatever name you
think you would use for it in ordinary conversation. I will record your answer on
the computer.
You can give a single word name, or the name can be more than one word.
Some objects may be hard to name, but try to give an answer for each one.
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Appendix B: Similarity Instructions
Function Similarity Instructions.
When you make your judgments, I'd like you to focus on the FUNCTION or
USE of each object; that is, how it is used to prepare and serve or hold food or
other items (containing a liquid, with solid items resting on it, etc.) I'd like you to
judge as similar those objects that you think are very similar to each other in how
they FUNCTION, and judge as less similar the ones that are less similar in
FUNCTION.
Note that we are interested in how 'similar the OBJECTS themselves are,
not what is prepared or served in the objects. Only judge two pictures as very
similar if the objects are like each other in how they work. Do NOT judge them as
similar just because the objects are used to serve or prepare things which are
found together. For instance, if one object is for preparing salad and another is for
serving or eating salad from, or if one is for cooking casserole and one is used to
eat casserole from, DON'T call them similar unless you really think the objects
themselves perform their function in a similar way.
Physical Similarity Instructions.
When you make your judgments, I'd like you to focus on the PHYSICAL
QUALITIES of each object. To do so, use just those properties that you can see
from looking at the picture. Specifically, consider the object's SHAPE, SIZE,
COLOR, TEXTURE, and RELATIVE SHININESS. Please don't use any other
properties you might know about from having seen the objects before; focus only
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on the information provided by the picture. I'd like you to judge as similar those
objects that you think are very similar to each other PHYSICALLY and judge as
less similar the ones that are less similar PHYSICALLY.
Note that we are interested in how physically similar the OBJECTS
themselves are, not what is prepared or served in the objects. Only judge two
pictures as very similar if the objects are like each other in the physical properties
listed above. Do NOT judge them as similar just because the objects are used to
serve or prepare things which are found together. For instance, if one object is for
preparing salad and another is for serving or eating salad from, or if one is for
cooking casseroles an one is used to eat casseroles from, DON'T call them highly
similar unless you really think the objects themselves are alike in their shape.
Size, color, texture, and relative shininess.
Overall Similarity Instructions.
When you make your judgments, I'd like you to consider ALL the qualities
of each object; that is, all its features including what it looks like, how it holds any
substances (with solid objects placed on it or inside it, holding a liquid, etc.) And
any other aspect of the object that seems important or natural to you. I'd like you
to judge as similar those objects that you think are very similar to each other
OVERALL, and judge as less similar the ones that are less similar OVERALL.
Note that we are interested in how similar the OBJECTS themselves are,
not what is prepared or served in the objects. Only judge two pictures as very
similar if the objects are similar to each other in all respects. Do NOT judge them
as similar just because the objects are used to prepare or serve things which are
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found together. For instance, ifone object is for preparing salad and another is for
serving salad or eating ,salad from, or if one is for cooking casserole and another is
used to eat casserole from, DON'T call them highly similar unless you really think
the objects themselves are similar in all respects.
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